@InProceedings{   KlimosLarsenStefanakThaarup:LATA:2012,
  Author        = "Klimo{\v{s}}, Miroslav and Larsen, Kim G. and {\v{S}}tefa{\v{n}}{\'a}k, Filip and Thaarup, Jeppe",
  Editor        = "Dediu, Adrian-Horia and Mart{\'\i}n-Vide, Carlos",
  Abstract      = {Concurrent game structures model multi-player games played on finite graphs where the players simultaneously choose their moves and collectively determine the next state of the game. We extend this model with prices on transitions for each player. We study pure Nash equilibria in this framework where each player's payoff is the accumulated price of all transitions until reaching their goal state. We provide a construction of a B{\"u}chi automaton accepting all Nash equilibria outcomes and show how this construction can be used to solve a variety of related problems, such as finding pareto-optimal equilibria. Furthermore, we prove the problem of deciding the existence of equilibria to be NP-complete.},
  Address       = "Berlin, Heidelberg",
  BookTitle     = "Proc. of LATA'12",
  date-added    = "2020-02-06 19:34:40 +0100",
  date-modified = "2020-02-06 19:35:22 +0100",
  ISBN          = "978-3-642-28332-1",
  Pages         = "363--376",
  Publisher     = "Springer Berlin Heidelberg",
  Title         = "Nash Equilibria in Concurrent Priced Games",
  Year          = "2012",
  File          = "Nash equilibria in concurrent priced games - c0fa6bd16c21ab76e6ed288653f8d744f5d5 - a - a - a - v.pdf"
}

@InProceedings{ KlimosLarsenStefanakThaarup:LATA:2012, Author = "Klimo{\v{s}}, Miroslav and Larsen, Kim G. and {\v{S}}tefa{\v{n}}{\'a}k, Filip and Thaarup, Jeppe", Editor = "Dediu, Adrian-Horia and Mart{\'\i}n-Vide, Carlos", Abstract = {Concurrent game structures model multi-player games played on finite graphs where the players simultaneously choose their moves and collectively determine the next state of the game. We extend this model with prices on transitions for each player. We study pure Nash equilibria in this framework where each player's payoff is the accumulated price of all transitions until reaching their goal state. We provide a construction of a B{\"u}chi automaton accepting all Nash equilibria outcomes and show how this construction can be used to solve a variety of related problems, such as finding pareto-optimal equilibria. Furthermore, we prove the problem of deciding the existence of equilibria to be NP-complete.}, Address = "Berlin, Heidelberg", BookTitle = "Proc. of LATA'12", date-added = "2020-02-06 19:34:40 +0100", date-modified = "2020-02-06 19:35:22 +0100", ISBN = "978-3-642-28332-1", Pages = "363--376", Publisher = "Springer Berlin Heidelberg", Title = "Nash Equilibria in Concurrent Priced Games", Year = "2012", File = "Nash equilibria in concurrent priced games - c0fa6bd16c21ab76e6ed288653f8d744f5d5 - a - a - a - v.pdf" }